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AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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Robert Treat Paine
Sept. 26 1918

To His Excellency,
The President of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. President,

May I submit for your consideration the suggestion that the times are now ripe for three steps?

I. A Summons To The Smaller Nationalities.

You have spoken, in words listened to across the oceans, in behalf of a world to be made safe for Democracy and in behalf of the smaller nations to whom justice is to be given. What interpretation, however, do the different nationalities make of these principles as applied to themselves?

Some months ago the impression prevailed that the United States would be content to see Austria-Hungary emerge from the war with its domination still in existence over its subject races. Secretary Lansing last July expressed the sympathy of our Government for their nationalistic aspirations. Still more concrete testimony is the creation and the recruitment of a Slavic and of a Polish Legion. England, France and Italy have taken the unprecedented step of giving official recognition to the Czecho-Slovak nation and Council. Italy has also reached a generous understanding with the Jugo-Slavs. Nevertheless, in spite of all that has been said and done, I believe we have not fully touched the heartstrings of these smaller races.

In our Revolution, France sent over her fleets and armies, yet her assistance to us is wrapped up in the name of Lafayette, which remains an abiding, living force. In the Civil War the men of the North stamped out slavery by their principles as well as by their bayonets. Lincoln, with sagacious patience, bided his time; yet it was the talismanic name of "Massa Lincoln" that evoked the utmost effort of every colored man.

Therefore, I beg of you, through Congress, to address these smaller nationalities. You are the spokesman of the Allies. The listening races regard you as the mouthpiece of the con-

science and the heart and the high principles of the American people. To you it is given to speak directly to them and to convince them that the outcome of the war shall seal the Magna Charta of their liberties and to summon them to co-operate, through every appropriate effort everywhere, in winning freedom for themselves. Let the voice of America with its encouragement, thrill the souls of these peoples to rise and fight and die for their own emancipation. For this cause they have been waiting. The ferment is at work. In spite of handicap and hazard, armed bands are here and there setting up the standard of revolt. It needs but an electric spark to cause these smouldering fires to burst into a conflagration that shall help to overwhelm the Central Empires.

Let the war seem no longer merely a defense against Teutonic aggression; let it appear irrational and ludicrous to consider it a war of commercial rivalries; let it become, self-evidently and dramatically, a war of the nations for self-government for each and for justice to all.

America has raised the ideals and standards of the conflict. America has entered into it as summoned by God to a crusade for Humanity. Is not America justly privileged to say the word that shall give the final sanction to the nature of the conflict?

One thing, however, is wanting. We can hardly speak for the Armenians—tried and tested Christians for a thousand years, and now and lately passing through the tortures of Hell; nor for the Syrians, whose virile sturdiness of character won for the Lebanon the right to a Christian governor sixty years ago. Nor can we interfere for Palestine. And I foresee that in after years America will have the deep regret that it raised not a finger for Jerusalem.

II. Declaration of War Against Turkey.

America is entitled to much of the credit for obtaining unity of command but our conduct seems somewhat inconsistent and illogical, for all the evils we decry in the Central Empires are present in extreme measure in Turkey, and her subject nationalities are in dire need of liberation. Our promise of help to oppressed peoples was not, should not, must not, be based on favoritism. The heart of the Nation longs for a declaration of war against Turkey. Only because of its confidence in you,

sir, because you have hitherto refrained from saying the word, has it checked and concealed its impatience.

To Reach Russia.

From a military point of view, also, a declaration of war is highly desirable. The war is likely to last another year if not longer. Before the German military machine is beaten to its knees, it is probable that one or more of her allies will crack and give up. If Turkey could be overthrown, Russia could be reached directly through the Dardanelles, and the Russians would then be able, as well as eager, to throw off German domination. By such revived life in Russia Germany would be greatly weakened and the task of the Allies' forces in France rendered easier in the final fearful smashing of the German armies.

Vladivostok is impossible as a base from which to supply through six thousand miles of a single railway, of double trackage, Russian armies fighting Germany on the Polish front. All available use of it should be made in order to keep Siberia and Eastern Russia from falling into the hands of the Germans, and to assist the Czecho-Slovaks, and thus set up nuclei around which the Russians may rally; but while most beneficial such gain is largely negative and not sufficient. Likewise it is important to make the fullest use of Archangel and Kola to reach Northern Russia. But even when Russia had her own factories going full blast both Vladivostok and Archangel were unable to make up the deficiencies. Today the industrial situation is deplorable, army supply factories have been largely abandoned and the transportation system is seriously disarranged; therefore the free passage of the Dardanelles, which is the natural, normal means of approach to European Russia, is essential and would enable the Allies to pour in supplies of all kinds and put the Russians more or less on their feet again, and would thereby greatly help to debar Germany and Austria from obtaining food, minerals, other supplies and men from the Ukraine. It would be a terrible blow to Germany.

Turkey and the Missionaries.

There is a rumor that Turks are revolting in Asia Minor. The incident lately reported about the placards posted in

Constantinople asserting that the Germans were their real enemies is illuminating. It is fairly evident that the people have lost desire for further fighting against the Allies.

The wonderful work done by American missionaries for many years in their educational institutions, their hospitals and their chapels has appealed to the peoples there, though they do not quite understand these missionaries, who appear to have no ulterior motives, yet live and work and die to serve and help them. It is not strange therefore that they have given both these missionaries and the land of freedom across the ocean that has sent them, their respect and their affection.

At the same time therefore with the declaration of war there should go to these peoples a proclamation, signed authoritatively by and in behalf of the missionaries, explaining the purposes of our coming:—that we come in the true spirit of friendship and service for all the peoples,—Turkish and Mohammedan, as well as Christian and Jewish; that we come not to wreak vengeance, not to kill, plunder and destroy; that where American soldiers have gone, peace and order, prosperity and happiness have followed.

It is not entirely groundless to believe that the Turkish armies would melt away rather than put up a back-to-the-wall, desperate resistance against us. The peoples would welcome our soldiers with open arms.

Is it contended that the two hundred odd American missionaries still in Turkey would be massacred and that all the valuable plant totalling perhaps twenty five millions of dollars would be destroyed? Neither is at all likely—yet weighed in the scales with the other mighty forces and consequences of the war, both are insignificant: hundreds of lives are being offered daily in the sacred cause and the grand total above is only about what America spends every twelve hours in the fight.

In Turkey the best time for campaigning is during the winter, when the French front has been more or less quiescent. Three or four divisions of colored troops would fight splendidly there. Add a division of Western troops and a brigade of Filippinos. Transportation across the Pacific in October or November would be troublesome, but safe from submarines. Practically there would be little or no subtraction

from the forces available for the fighting on the Western front.

Analogies With Our Civil War.

In the Civil War Grant's army never crushed Lee in battle, yet Grant kept up his sledge hammer blows against him in Virginia and, in large measure, won because, as Commander-in-Chief, he used his other armies, Sheridan in the Shenandoah, Thomas in the West, Sherman in the South, to keep up a constant pressure, to ravage the country, and to prevent Lee from receiving further resources of men and supplies till the final end was inevitable. But the North was not so foolish as to confine its fighting to Virginia and to refuse supplies and men to the other sectors. Strenuous efforts were made to open the Mississippi River and to cut off the Trans-Mississippi territory. Grant never fought in Virginia regardless of what was happening elsewhere. When Lee began to weaken Grant did not cease operations elsewhere but planned to drive home the blow in the rear. If Lee could have had with him the armies which were opposing Thomas and Sherman, Lee would not have surrendered when he did at Appomattox. It is easy to see the analogy in these moves to the present war.

The Battle Front is One, Not Western Only.

Harder fighting lies ahead on the Western front—the inspiring victories in the three salients have been largely won in open fighting or against trenches comparatively weak and not designed to be defensive. To attack and break through the many lines of strongly prepared defense systems may bring mourning to our land such as has come to France and England.

Senator Lodge says in his speech (August 23) that the "victory of attack, though begun, is still to be won" and yet he is right when he asserts that "peace must be won finally and thoroughly in German territory." Yes, but how? By what means? By blindly plunging ahead without regard to what is, or may be, done elsewhere? Our country may be willing that Pershing with his sledge hammer blows should, like Grant, earn the title, as he may, of "The Butcher" and that he should fight it out if it takes all next summer, but it surely will not be willing that he should wade in unnecessary Ameri-

can blood, as Grant would have done if he had not organized his attacks on the flank and rear of the Confederacy, and as Pershing will do if the other sectors of the Allied battle line are not regarded with due consideration. Senator Lodge may well speak of our pouring out the blood of our chosen youth upon the altar of patriotism, but there will come a day of reckoning if such blood is needlessly poured out because of the prejudices, hesitation and lack of decision of State and Foreign Departments.

The American soldiers appear to combine, in considerable measure, the dogged determination of the Briton, the dash of the Celt and the Gaul, the aggressiveness of the Canadian and the ferocity of the Australian. No wonder the Germans have given them, or at least the Marines, the name of "Teufel Hunden." That measures, somewhat significantly, the fear, which seems to approximate almost to a state of terror, which is now spreading through Germany as they begin to grasp the fighting spirit and the portentous size of the American armies.

Marshal Foch may well keep up his constant pressure but, unless the German morale goes entirely to pieces, it will be more judicious, if there is a chance this winter of Turkey collapsing and of Russia again, even if feebly, taking up arms, to postpone the effort to smash through till the Germans have had to weaken their lines and send men back to their Eastern front. And then by spring, if there were a Turkish collapse, the American troops, used in the East, could be brought to the Austrian front or to France.

The "Westerners" make a serious blunder when they ignore the Eastern sections and would concentrate entirely upon the Western front. Grant that the heaviest fighting and the final decisive crushing of the German armies are to take place there, yet would it not make a tremendous difference in that fighting on the Western front, if, Bulgaria having made peace and Turkey having been shattered, Austria were hit on flank and rear and Germany had again to face a Russian foe? There is but one answer to such a question. The war should be regarded and studied as a whole and no sector fought regardless of the rest, or there will be paid a fearful and needless toll in killed and wounded. The Allies have all in turn exhibited military pride, but for most of them it has gone and after their disasterous experience they are now beginning to

see daylight ahead in their common subordination to one supreme head. May we be saved from similar military pride that may lead to dangerous military optimism.

III. Arrange For Bulgaria's Surrender.

There are rumors of strained relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. If Bulgaria should make peace with the Allies Turkey, cut off from Germany and Austria, could not long hold out. With Bulgaria at peace, the army at Salonika, which is now in a position of stalemate, would then become available, part to attack Turkey and part at once to proceed north, free Serbia, enable the Jugo-Slavs to rise in effective revolt, and attack Austria on her unguarded flank.

Bulgaria is now making what is called a German peace offensive. Whether suggested by, or intended to be in the interest of Germany or not, that is no reason for the Allies not to let Bulgaria lay down her arms and have peace on their own terms when the rewards of such a peace are so immensely beneficial, if not decisive and vital to the Allied cause. If the Allies finally win a decisive victory, what terms will they then grant to Bulgaria? Why not grant the same terms now when a Bulgarian peace, or surrender, if that is the more correct description, goes far to guarantee an earlier and conclusive triumph?

Justice Not Punishment.

What are such terms? They should be in fundamental compliance with the peace formulas you have laid down. The terms should be so just, even so liberal, that no burning rancor will be left to create future embroilments in the Balkans. Her neighbors will have the very natural desire to strip her to the bone, but this must not be permitted. We can understand and sympathize with the rankling animosities felt for the Bulgarians by their neighbors; but we are not in this war to punish other nations. What we strive for is justice, even justice to our foes. Such justice recognized as such by all, is the only sure foundation for the peaceful and friendly intercourse of neighbors in the future. Bitter punishment will make the Bulgarians pray and prepare, during long years, for revenge and make them in consequence the willing tools and slaves of the Germans. It will also make them endure an autocracy

and a military regime as the best instruments wherewith to accomplish their designs for vengeance and to regain Bulgaria Irredenta. Punishment rather than justice is therefore as irrational and short-sighted as it is contrary to the Allies' principles of conduct. Even where justice within the state is concerned with dangerous criminals it is often advisedly allowed that one should be permitted to turn State's evidence and so render more inevitable the condign punishment of others.

Terms of Peace.

Let Bulgaria keep the portion of southern Dobrudja which was taken from her after the war in 1913; let her have in the West, in Macedonia, the territorial lines agreed upon under the sagacious leadership of the Greek statesman Venizelos, when he organized the Balkan alliance against Turkey, which territorial arrangement was defeated at the London Conference chiefly by Austria and Germany; let her have Adrianople and the adjoining territory as far as the Enos-Midia line. She must at once surrender and give back all the other districts outside these lines which she now occupies. It may also be necessary to make some modifications in favor of Greece in the Venizelian lines as regards Kavala and the territory just back of Salonika.

Our Allies.

If Roumania keeps Bessarabia, and gains Roumanian districts in Transylvania, she will be compensated beyond measure in territory, population and economic advantages. If Serbia gains Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slavonia and Croatia, as a new, powerful Jugo-Slav state she will rise from her Teutonic ashes with a great future. Greece, for whom America cares, historically and intellectually, with a real warmth of affection, would not be forgotten. Territorial adjustments in her favor are possible, in a slight measure, north of Epirus. Rhodes and the Sporades, the islands off the coast of Asia Minor, which Italy is now occupying, might be turned over to her, though Italy should be allowed to retain them if strongly desirous of doing so, in view of her generous self-denial with reference to the Slavs; also Cyprus, which England lately offered her. But the real prize comes from the fact that Turkey must be driven out of Europe. Constanti-

nople must have a Christian government. Let Greece be given Constantinople and the adjoining territory back to the Enos-Midia line and thus realize the glorious dream of her destiny. The administration should be under international restrictions, which should give to Russia and to Roumania free passage of the Dardanelles and such other guarantees as they may fairly ask for.

Macedonia.

It is not possible to lay down in Macedonia any definite line which will exactly separate from each other the different races,—for they overlap and intermingle in most intricate fashion. Bulgaria might agree to accept the arbitration of the United States as to which districts should go to her in accordance with the principle, so far as it could be applied, that she should receive those districts in which Bulgarians either constitute more than fifty per cent. of the population or largely exceed any other race A reasonable demarkation was, however, practically arrived at when in 1912 the three interested states fixed upon the lines to which they mutually agreed. These lines were not adhered to in the treaty of Bucharest, when, after those three states had been jointly and victoriously fighting Turkey, they fell to quarrelling among themselves, at which moment Roumania stepped in to help Serbia and Greece crush Bulgaria. The results of this treaty were territorially unfair to the Bulgarians inasmuch as territory and population were taken by the three victors without due regard to racial affinities. In a prominent paper it was declared that the results were, so far as it knew, approved of in no single European journal. In round figures, as a result of the two wars, in the first of which Macedonia was freed from Turkey, Serbia and Greece each gained a million and a half in population while Bulgaria received only half a million. New Serbia embraced about a quarter of a million Albanians who have their own aspirations and dislike intensely their grasping neighbors. Such were the boundaries controlling at the beginning of the war. Today Bulgaria occupies territory in excess of what is fair as then it occupied less. Wherefore it would seem as if a return in principle, subject to adjustments in details, to the "Venizelos" boundaries of 1912 might be the most natural and just solution of this vexing question. It should be unthinkable

that the Allied governments, scenting victory, should relapse into old human errors and, playing the tyrant and despoiler, re-establish injustice in flagrant defiance of their own principles.

Serbian Claims.

The claims of Serbia, not only in Macedonia, but also that certain districts should be taken away from Western Bulgaria to give Serbia a more strategic frontier and that Bulgaria must be shorn of the power for evil doing, fatal as they would have been in the consequences, pregnant with bitterness, military preparations and recurring war, were understandable when Serbia, like the other Balkan states, saw her only hope of aggrandizement possible of realization in the Balkans in fierce competition against each other; but today the conditions have radically changed since 1912-13 and these terms are impossible, unreasonable and not to be considered, when she is destined to receive the gift of six or seven millions of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes taken from the Austrian Empire; while her total population even after the treaty of Bucharest did not exceed, probably, four and a half millions. Bulgaria with her five odd millions will be sufficiently outclassed. Today if the Allies win, the horizon of their Balkan allies will be enlarged to permit of their seeing and entering upon new "Promised Lands" which make the minor Balkan adjustments seem trivial beyond comparison. If properly presented to them Serbia, Roumania and even Greece should agree to such a settlement which would put them in possession of princely kingdoms, including for each practically all of their own race except those who live in far scattered groups.

If Bulgaria is permitted to have peace by a surrender on such a just basis, she must allow the Allied troups free passage through Thrace against Turkey, and through Macedonia against Austria; and a further condition might well be insisted upon that her Czar, the tricky and distrusted Ferdinand, should abdicate, though he might be allowed to keep his crown if his forces would join with the Allies to help give the final *coup de grace* to the Unspeakable Turk and oust him from Europe.

If it be objected that the Ailies are thus allowing Bulgaria to retain districts which her Balkan neighbors themselves desire, and that the Allies do not now have in their possession the

territories which are to compensate the latter, the answer is plain, that while that is so, the gift to Bulgaria is, in the first place, right on the fundamental lines of justice set forth for Allied conduct, and, secondly, is only made in case Bulgaria drops out of the fight, and thus allows Turkey to be crushed, Russia to be directly reached and Austria to be attacked.

A Balkan Settlement.

These Balkan states will play a dangerous game, rash and reckless, if they insist on their extreme, their maximum claims in this particular Macedonian territory. A German peace offensive is on the cards for this autumn and winter. If, realizing her military failure, she offers to evacuate and recompense Belgium, to restore Alsace and Lorraine, to give Italy the Trentino and Trieste, to let Bohemia and Poland be duly set up and makes a satisfactory settlement on other points, the Western peoples could not be kept fighting simply to make good the extreme claims of Serbia, Roumania and Greece in the Balkans, to "punish" Bulgaria and to force a peace racially unsound. America surely could not be expected to do so when even today she is calmly at peace with Bulgaria and Turkey.

Without our help this year it is generally admitted that the Germans might have won. So that without our help the Balkan states would have lost the game—wherefore the voice of America should be influential, if not decisive, in deciding what the Allied cause and what justice call for in a peace settlement in the Balkans. Today the three Balkan states have lost all the districts which it is proposed should be retained by Bulgaria. Unless there is Allied victory, there is no hope of their regaining any of these districts, and unless there is Allied victory, Roumania and Serbia will remain ground under the Teutonic heel. Bulgaria's surrender assures Allied victory.

War With Bulgaria Unless She Yields.

If the Bulgarian people really want peace, are sick of fighting, begin to fear a German debacle in which they also will go down, recognize the justice of the terms offered by the Allies, and realize that in this way they are assured of a peaceful and happy future, then conceivably there may be such pressure from the people that Sofia will yield. The threat of United States hostilities might strengthen considerably Bul-

garia's present disposition towards peace. Unless Bulgaria does so yield in the immediate future, the United States should declare war against her. Czar Ferdinand is fortunately, and very likely intentionally, now in Germany where he can get direct evidence as to the chill running down the German spine, and perceive the forebodings and the gloom that foreshadow their defeat, and consequently he may be eager to get under cover before the deluge bursts.

Greece.

Greece is our friend and ally. German propaganda has used the fact that the United States has not declared war against the two states with which Greece is directly fighting, to injure the Allied cause in Greece. A division of American troops would bring Greece tangible evidence of our support. Their contageous enthusiasm, their "rushing to battle as to a feast," might work the same transformation in Greece and Macedonia as it has helped to do in France. Greece is not a nation of such industrial development as to suffice by herself for her own complete mobilization. If the Allies will give Greece assistance, financially, in equipment, in munitions, Greece can add to her army several hundreds of thousands of men.

United Action and a Common Front.

In a military way, the Allies suffered until recently from the lack of a united single command and of a common front, and with two or three exceptions, also from a lack of the genius of military strategy. In a political way, they have been at a disadvantage, and they still are, because they have no single head to consider, decide and act promptly on political strategy. The French used to say, two years ago, that there were too many Allies. Painful military experience has at last, months too late, led to a military generalissimo with admittedly advantageous results. Similar happy consequences would follow a closer, prompter co-ordination of the political strategists. The Allies have not been entirely free from diplomatic blunders, of which some have seemed almost inevitable and excusable because of this difficulty of getting so many interested parties to agree promptly on a common policy. One, however, has some analogy to the present Balkan question.

Italy and Jugo-Slavia.

Early in the war Italy set forth pretensions to lands on the northern and eastern shores of the Adriatic. Slavs form the predominant body of the inhabitants, and they, naturally, were determined that these lands should be kept for Slav peoples; and therefore they fought in the Austrian army with keenness against the Italians. The Italian government is not alone to blame, for, by a secret treaty in April, 1915, the Allies apparently agreed to these demands. Recently the Italian government wisely moderated its claims and, at a Congress in Rome, in April, of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary, gave assurance that it had no designs on Slav lands on the Adriatic. The Jugo-Slavs declared in July, 1917, for union with Serbia and, since they are no longer antagonized by Italy, are enlisting in the Italian army, and are organizing in their own mountain districts at home. Much Italian blood has been shed in consequence of her earlier extreme pretensions. How much the war was prolonged and its success endangered cannot be estimated. Out perhaps from its humiliating defeat at Caporetto has come the gratifying change in its diplomatic attitude so that, in place of bitter animosities with its Slav neighbors, friendship will prevail, and instead of frowning fortifications dotting the boundaries, a "Christ of the Andes" may crown the Julian Alps. Cannot, will not America take the lead towards similar sanity in the Balkans?

A Separate Peace.

Because we are now at peace with Bulgaria, we can make the necessary approaches. Time is of the essence. Cannot the consent in principle be obtained from the Allies chiefly concerned, or permission at once to sound Bulgaria as to whether such a surrender on terms of fair play and justice is now possible?

A separate peace cannot be made with Austria or Turkey, because the proper terms of peace conformable to the standards of justice announced by the Allies, require that these two states must submit to such very material loss of territory and of population that it cannot be deemed reasonable that they would accept those terms until they suffer utter collapse. They must practically be dismembered and will hardly recognize themselves after the war is over. Indeed almost literally

fulfilled will be the prophetic words of Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian ambassador to the Berlin Congress in 1878, when, forced to yield in the subjection of the Slavs to Austria-Hungary, he said to the Hungarian ambassador, Count Andrassy, "Well, go in, but Bosnia-Herzegovina will prove to be the tomb of Austria-Hungary."

With Bulgaria it is different. Her people might well, and gladly, accept peace now on the same terms, territorially, as the Allies should grant, in all justice, at the end of the war.

America's Position.

There should be on America's part either peace or war in full accordance with our Allies: either peace by Bulgaria not only with us but with all, or if Bulgaria refuses peace, a reasonable peace from the Allied point of view, then we should declare war and stand on a common footing with the Allies as to all their enemies. If the Allies desire to pursue a policy towards Bulgaria of Vae Victis, then if we disapprove of such an extreme course of action let us try to moderate it but if we are to acquiesce in it let us do so with our full force. Let us not jeopardize Allied success by failure to act harmoniously with them. The situation calls for the exercise of American justice and of American power.

Aesop tried to teach the ancients by his fable of The Old Man and his Sons that the bundle of sticks, which would resist all efforts while firmly bound together, could be easily broken when the sticks were taken separately. *Divide et Impera* has long been a maxim of statecraft. The history of Europe is replete with instances where the falling away of a member from an alliance has changed the fortunes of war for its former allies. If the Central Empires are now ready to fly apart it will be unfortunate if the Allies so act as to force them to keep firmly together and so have to defeat them while having all the strength of the bundle of sticks.

A Counter Peace Offensive.

This Bulgarian peace offensive should be met with an Allied counter offensive. Under your leadership, Mr. President, it is possible to break through the enemy line, to turn their flank, and roll back their armies. There may be some analogy to the strategy exhibited by the genius of Marshal Foch, but the possibilities latent in the turning of the peace flank, are far more

tremendous. Enter on no negotiations with Germany. For her, with her present government and spirit, it is war to the finish. Germany "must be reduced to a condition where by no possibility can she precipitate another war for universal conquest" (Lodge). Let nothing divert us from this path, but let us take all reasonable steps to render certain its complete accomplishment.

Hitherto you have been acting as the acknowledged idealistic leader of the Allies. Now our country's leadership in this peace offensive will stamp us in the world's opinion as being as strong in practical statesmanship as in idealistic principles. Though the Allied peoples have their teeth set in firm determination to see the struggle through to the bitter end, they would welcome such a stroke of genius as would bring peace in sight with the assured triumph of Allied aims.

A War Plan, Not Pacifist.

This plan is not suggested out of love for the interest of Bulgarians. What happens to them as Bulgarians may cause us little thought. But what our dealing with them may do to assure an earlier and victorious peace and a thorough-going defeat of Germany, that should give us deep concern. This plan is not "defeatist" measure. It is not to patch up a compromise and so stop the war and its awful expenditure of blood and money. It is not to "cool the fighting blood" and lessen the military activity of the Allies. It is, on the contrary, a *war* measure, to enable the fighting to be forced home, to permit its overwhelming concentration on a divided and weakened foe, to beat the Germans to their knees, and to enable the Allies thereby to dictate at Berlin such terms as, in Allied opinion, shall lead to justice and continued peace between all nations in the coming years.

Wherefore it is submitted that it is now desirable to address directly the smaller nationalities to summon them to arms, to declare war on Turkey and to open a counter peace offensive against Bulgaria, which gives you an opportunity to take a practical step in bringing the war to a triumphant close.

Very respectfully submitted,

ROBERT TREAT PAINE.

September 2, 1918.
10 State Street, Boston, Mass.

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